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INTRODUCTION

HERE are a number of instances in which a federal court asserts personal jurisdiction by service of process beyond the
territorial limits of the state in which it sits. The most common
examples of these assertions ofjurisdiction are the use of a state's
long-arm statute' and the "bulge" provision of the federal rules. 2
But, in addition, there are a number of statutes by which Con*Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. A.B.,
Colgate University, 1968; J.D., Boston College, 1971.
I. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e); e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S.

378, 381 (1965).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(0. See iqfrai text accompanying notes 21-29.

(1)

01
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gress has authorized nationwide service of process in particular
3
circumstances.
It is generally accepted that Congress may authorize expansion of a federal district court's jurisdiction beyond the territorial
limits of the states in which it sits, including authorization of extraterritorial service of process. 4 However, a question which must
be considered is whether there are any constitutional limitations
on this congressional power and, if so, what those limitations are.
For absent any restrictions, defendants could find themselves
placed in the difficult position of having to litigate a case in a district far from home, with which they have no connection.
This article will begin by examining the principles which govern the assertion of personal jurisdiction in federal court. It will
analyze examples of situations in which nationwide service of process has been authorized for the purpose of establishing the paradigm by which such authorizations are justified and limited.
Finally, this article will suggest that the prevailing paradigm is inadequate and it will offer an alternative for dealing with this problem in the future.
II.

SERVICE OF PROCESS IN FEDERAL COURT

A.

PersonalJurisdiction in Federal Courts

In order for a federal court to assert personal jurisdiction
over a defendant, it must have power to do so. The defendant
must be amenable to service under a statute or rule of court
which authorizes the exercise ofjurisdiction, and that assertion of
jurisdiction must be consistent with the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. 5 Beyond this, service of process must be exercised in a manner both consistent with the authorizing provision
3. For a reference to statutes authorizing such nationwide service of process, see infra note 30.
4. E.g., Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946);
Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619 (1925); Peterfreund, Federal
Jurisdiction and Practice, 32 N.Y.U. I.. REV. 491, 499 n.65 (1957).
5. E.g., Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404. 409
(1987); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 221 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511,
514 (5th Cir. 1982); EdwardJ. Moriarty & Co. v. General [ire & Rubber Co..
289 F. Supp. 381, 390 (S.D. Ohio, 1967). Omni Capital does leave open the possibility of a common law service provision. For more detail on this point, see
niaa note 17. While most personal jurisdiction cases revolve around state court
jurisdiction and are restricted by the fourteenth amendment, it is the fifih
amendment which places due process limits on the courts of the federal government. E.g., Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974).
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and reasonably calculated to notify the defendant of the action."
The authority of a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant was historically limited as a general rule to persons
found or living in the judicial district. 7 In Robertson v. Railroad La-

bor Board" the Supreme Court stated that Congress had the power
to authorize the process of federal courts to run throughout the
United States. ' The Court went on to rule that such authorization had not been given in that case, which was a suit under the
Transportation Act of 1920. As such, "the general rule [that] the
jurisdiction of a district court in personam [was] limited to the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or in which he can be
found" was to govern the outcome.' 0
This concept of the limits of service has been broadened by
the adoption of rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The primary function of rule 4 is to set forth the appropriate
manner of service of process in federal courts.' I It expands on
the Robertson rule by stating in subsection (f) that the basic reach
of federal process covers the entire state in which the court is located when two or more judicial districts are located therein.' 2
Beyond this, rule 4(f) makes clear that service may be accomplished beyond the territorial limits of the state in which the district court sits if it is authorized by a federal statute or by the
rules.'" This provision must be read in conjunction with rule
6. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
7. Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838); Foster, Long-Arm
Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 9, 16 (1969). This was the situation prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Foster, supra, at 16.
8. 268 U.S. 619 (1925).
9. Id. at 622 (citing Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838);
United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878)). This congressional power arises out of'its general supervisory authority under article III, section 1 of the United States Constitution. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98
U.S. 569, 602 (1878).
10. Robertson, 268 U.S. at 627. In Omni Capital International . Rudolf lib/ff&
Co. the Supreme Court questioned whether Robertson has been undercut by subsequent decisions which have moved away from principles of territoriality. Having raised the question, however, it then stated that it expressed "no view as to
the continued validity of Robertson's rationales." 108 S. Ct. 404, 412 n.10 (1987).
11. 2J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK & C. [fIOMPSON, MOORE'S FEDERAL. PRACTICE 114.02[1], [21 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter MOORE].
12. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946). The
relevant part of FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f is set forth infra in the text accompanying
note 2 1.
13. A detailed explanation of the relation of rules 4(e) and 4(f) is set forth
in 2 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAl. PRACTICE § 4.32121
(2d ed. 1986) 1hereinafter MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE].
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4(e), which deals with extraterritorial service of process and provides that, in the absence of a federal statute, extraterritorial service may be accomplished as provided by the rules. 1 4 The second
sentence of the rule incorporates by reference the state court
practice of the state in which the district court sits as an alternative means of service.
One other provision of rule 4(f) is relevant to this discussion.
The second sentence of that section effectively provides for the
expansion of jurisdiction in the appropriate circumstances by a
100 mile "bulge" from the place at which the courthouse is located, even though service may thereby be effected beyond the
state's boundaries, as long as it is within the United States. 15
In summary, rule 4 effectively states that a district court may
assert jurisdiction over any party within the state in which it sits,
and beyond the state's territorial boundaries if service is authorized by state law, a special federal statute or the 100 mile "bulge"
provision.
While courts have traditionally stated that rule 4 attempts to
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) provides:
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in
lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the
state in which the district court is held, service may be made under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute or order, or,
if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of service, in a
manner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the
state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party
not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or
notice to him to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason
of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his property located within the state, service may in either case be made under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
This rule was read in conjunction with former FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7) which appeared to be primarily concerned with use of state law for serving defendants
who were inhabitants of or found within the state in which the district court sat.
4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1114, at 24142 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter WRIGHT]; Foster,JudicialEconomy; Fairnessand Conivenience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Distmict Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73, 94
n.63 (1968). However, there was apparently no intention to draw a sharp line
between the two rules, but rather they were intended to overlap. WRIGHT, supra,
at 243; Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (1). 77
HARV. L. REV. 601, 619-22 (1964); The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure eliminated rule 4(d)(7), and incorporated its substance into
rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i). MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 13,
4.08[3]. The
new rule should be interpreted in the same way as its predecessor. Id.
15. E.g., Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 1979)
("ITlhe 100 mile bulge provision has effectively expanded the territorialjurisdiction of a federal district court beyond state lines ....").For a discussion of
the policy underlying the "bulge" provision, see infra note 22.
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do no more than set forth the appropriate manner of service of
process,' it is clear that it goes further. It incorporates federal
and state standards authorizing assertions ofjurisdiction: that is,
not merely how service is accomplished but whether a defendant
is amenable to suit. In addition, by providing for service throughout the state and within the 100 mile "bulge," it is authorizing,
without other reference, some assertions of jurisdiction.
While typical questions of jurisdiction relate to whether the
defendant has sufficient connection with the state where the district court sits to warrant service, 17 this is not always the case.
Two exceptions to this generalization are the "bulge" provision
included in rule 4(f)18 and those federal statutes which authorize
nationwide service of process. 1 9 In these situations, the territorial
limits of effective service are expanded beyond the boundaries of
the state in which the district court sits. As numerous authorities
have pointed out, the fifth amendment due process clause provides the applicable constitutional standard in reviewing these assertions of jurisdiction since we are concerned with the federal
16. E.g., Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Greece, 360 F.2d 103, 109 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966). There is a minority view, however, which sees Rule
4 as a basis for asserting jurisdiction. Berger, Acquiring in PersonamJurisdiction in
Federal Question Cases: ProceduralFrustration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4,
1982 UTAH L. REV. 285, 288-93; Foster, supra note 7, at 16-17 n.28.
17. The several types of cases which can be brought in federal court usually
require this sort of "sufficient connection." In diversity cases it is generally accepted that state law governs and the federal court must determine if the defendant is amenable to suit under state law, and whether that is consistent with
due process. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
ContraJaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960); Green,
FederalJurisdictionIn Personam of Corporationsand Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967
(1961). In a federal question case, the federal court may only assert jurisdiction
to the same extent as a state court, if pursuant to the second sentence of rule
4(e), it makes use of the state's long-arm statute because of the absence of a
federal statute providing for service. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,
108 S. Ct. 404, 409-11 (1987); DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260,
1264-69 (5th Cir. 1983); Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511, 51417 (5th Cir. 1982). In Omni Capitalthe requirements of the applicable state longarm statute were not met, and it was suggested that the federal courts develop
their own rule to authorize service. The Supreme Court refused to decide
whether it could "fashion a rule authorizing service of process," because it felt
that even if it had such power, it was not prepared to exercise it in the case
before it. This was because it had always been assumed that statutory authorization was necessary, and it was not prepared to go beyond this assumption since
it felt that Congress was in a better position to structure service rules, and that it
would be appropriate to show "circumspection... in going beyond what Congress had authorized." 108 S.Ct. at 411-13.
18. For a discussion of the "bulge" provision, see infira notes 21-29 and
accompanying text. See also Berger, supra note 16, at 318-19 n.157.
19. For a general reference to statutes authorizing nationwide service of
process, see infra note 30.
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government's power to require a defendant to appear.2 1° The
question is what is the appropriate limiting standard under the
fifth amendment. To fully analyze this question it is necessary to
consider examples of such assertions of jurisdiction, the reasons
for them and the congressional authority to allow them.
B.

Amenability Without Reference to State Boundaries

1. Rule 4(f)-The "Bulge" Service Provision
Rule 4(f) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[P]ersons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule
14, or as additional parties to a pending action or a
counterclaim or cross-claim therein pursuant to Rule 19,
may be served in the manner stated in paragraphs (1)-(6)
of subdivision (d) of this rule at all places outside the
state but within the United States that are not more than
100 miles from the place in which the action is commenced ....21
The purpose behind this provision, according to the advisory
committee, was "to promote the objective of enabling the court
to determine entire controversies" by expanding personal jurisdiction over a limited class of additional parties. 2 2 Implicit in the
advisory committee's understanding of the rule is a concern over
whether this purpose is a sufficient justification for extending jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of the state in which the district
court is sitting based solely on the party's connection with the
lawsuit, irrespective of the quality of contacts with the forum. Be20. E.g., Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub norn., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Engineering Equip. Co.
v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Foster, supra note 7, at 31;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 2 comment
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 comment f (1980).

b (1969);

RESTATE-

21. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). The provision was added by an amendment to the
rule in 1963. MOORE, supra note 11, 4.42[2.-3]. It was amended to its present
form in 1966. Id. at 4.01[26].
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee's note to 1963 amendment subdi-

vision () [hereinafter Committee's Note]. As the advisory committee pointed
out, this provision's primary value is "in metropolitan areas spanning more than
one State." Id. Courts have generally agreed that the rule provides for both the
manner of service of process and the amenability of the party to service. The

only limitation imposed is that the party served must have minimum contacts
either with the "bulge," e.g., Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 415-17
(5th Cir. 1979), or the entire state in which service is accomplished. E.g., Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250, 251-53 (2d Cir.
1968); MOORE, supra note 11, 4.42[2.-3] at 4-402 n.22.
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yond this the committee had to consider whether the Supreme
Court could authorize such an expansion of jurisdiction.
Regarding the appropriateness of such a rule, the committee
indicated that it would operate in only a limited number of situations.2 3 In addition, the increased territorial range would not be
a hardship to parties in light of modern systems of communications and travel. 24 Regarding the Supreme Court's power to authorize such a provision, the committee simply cited Mississippi
25
Publishing Corp. v. Murphree.
In Murphree the United States Supreme Court rendered an
opinion which is invariably cited for the proposition that congressional authorization ofjurisdiction is not limited by state boundaries.2' In this case a resident of the northern district of
Mississippi filed a suit for libel in the district court against a Delaware corporation. The defendant had an office in the southern
district of Mississippi and had consented to suit in Mississippi.
The libel was published in the southern district. In the context of
discussing a number of objections raised by the defendant, the
Court considered the significance of its consent. It pointed out
that such consent rendered the defendant "present" in the state
and thus subject to service under the provision of rule 4 which
authorized service throughout the state and not simply in the district. In this context, the Court asserted that "Congress could
27
provide for service of process anywhere in the United States."
Since Congress had this power, although it had not exercised it
statutorily, the Court believed that it could effectuate such service
through its rulemaking power. 28 Thus the opinion both confirms
the power of Congress to authorize personal jurisdiction without
reference to state boundaries, and the Court's authority to exer2
cise such service through its rulemaking power. 9
23. Committee's Note, supra note 22.
24. Id.; Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the TerritorialReach of Federal
Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520, 535 (1963).
25. Committee's Note, supra note 22 (citing Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946)).
26. E.g., Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 1979): see
AMERICAN

LAW INSTITUTE,

STUDY OF THE DIVISION

STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,
ter ALI STUDY].

OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN

Supporting Memorandum B 437 (1969) [hereinaf-

27. 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) (citing Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
300, 328 (1838); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878);
Robertson, 268 U.S. at 622).
28. Id. at 442-43. See supra note 9.
29. 326 U.S. at 442-43; ALI STUDY, supra note 26, at 441; WRIGHT, supra
note 14, § 1127. The opinion went on to make clear that it was permissible for
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This analysis disposes of the concerns of the advisory committee concerning the bulge provision, and, in addition, serves as
a basis for the principle that Congress has the power to authorize
nationwide service of process. However, it avoids any direct comment on the question of whether there are due process limitations
on these authorizations of service of process. The reason for this
may simply be that there is no real problem with due process in
the "bulge" service situation. Murphree makes it clear that there is
no legitimate basis for saying that a federal court's territorial
reach is necessarily limited by state borderlines, and that Congress has the power to authorize service of process across state
lines. If this is so, then it can be argued that expanding a district
by 100 miles from the courthouse, as the advisory committee suggests, is not onerous or unreasonable and therefore not violative
of personal due process rights. But to conclude that a slight increase in the reach of federal jurisdiction beyond state borders is
valid does not resolve the question whether (and to what extent)
limitations can or should be placed on more expansive assertions
ofjurisdiction such as nationwide service of process. In considering this question it is necessary to examine how the courts have
dealt with situations in which Congress has authorized jurisdiction far beyond the limits of the 100 mile bulge.
2.

CongressionalAuthorization of Nationwide Service of Process

Congress has exercised its power to provide for nationwide
service of process in a number of areas. 3 0 Typical examples of
this type of legislation are the jurisdictional provisions of the
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,31 the Federal Interpleader
Act, 32 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.33 An examination of the purposes of these provisions, and how the courts have
the rules to be used to implement this federal power in the absence of explicit
action by Congress. In the view of the court this neither violated FED. R. Civ. P.
82 nor the Enabling Act. The court stated that rule 82 had to be construed with
rule 4(f) since the advisory committee had drafted both. As such the court saw
rule 82 as referring only to venue and subject matter jurisdiction. The Enabling
Act was not violated since the court viewed the rules as only affecting the manner and means of recovery, but not substantive rights. 326 U.S. at 445-46.
30. For a listing.of statutes authorizing nationwide service of process, see
4.33 & 4.42[2.-1]; Berger, supra note 16, at 318-19
MOORE, supra note 11,
n.157.
31. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e) (1982).
32. Id. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361.
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78KK (1982).
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treated them, will be of assistance in formulating a general approach to nationwide service of process.
a.

Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962

Two major cases3 4 have fully considered situations in which
jurisdiction was obtained by nationwide service of process under
the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962.3 5 The relevant section
provides:
A civil action in which each defendant is an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or any agency of the United States, may, except as
otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial
district in which: (1) a defendant in the action resides, or
(2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides
if no real property is involved in the action.
The summons and complaint in such action shall be
served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules
may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial lim36
its of the district in which the action is brought.
The section has been described as a "plaintiff's provision"
34. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'don other gioinds sub
nom., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382
(D.R.I. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds sub norn., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
35. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e) (1982). It appears that the nationwide service of process provision set forth in this section is intended to confer personal
jurisdiction and is not simply a method of service applicable to a defendant already amenable to suit. E.g., United States ex rel. Garcia v. McAninch, 435 F.
Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). Contra United States ex rel. Rudick v. Laird, 412
F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 918 (1969). Rudick would seem to be
undercut by the dictum in the later Second Circuit opinion of Liberation News
Service v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1382 (2d Cir. 1970).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1982). The Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962
also added 28 U.S.C. § 1361 which enlarged the subject matter jurisdiction of
federal district courts by specifically authorizing mandamus actions to require
government officials to perform their duties. By "historic (sic) accident" such
proceedings had previously been limited to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in
1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2784, 2785; see Stafford v. Briggs, 444
U.S. 527, 533-35 (1980); Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of /he landanis and Veile
Act of 1962 and ".Vonstatntory'"Judicial Review of Federal Adininistrative Action, 81
HARV. L. REV. 308, 310-13 (1967).
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which is intended to allow suits against supervisory federal officials or heads of agencies in places other than the District of Columbia, where they usually have their official residences. 3 7 It also
is intended to avoid the situation in which a plaintiff wished or
was required to sue two indispensable federal officers in her
home state, but only one resided there.38 It accomplishes these
purposes by expanding the possible bases for proper venue and
allowing service of process by certified mail beyond the territorial
limits of the state in which the court is located. 3 9
In considering these provisions, Congress made only passing
reference to the service of process provision. 40 Its primary focus
was to provide a local forum for resolution of such disputes. 4 1
While it has been generally accepted that the section provides for
nationwide service of process, it has been left to the courts to consider whether there are any constitutional limits on this congressional authorization.
In Briggs v. Goodwin 4 2 the plaintiffs sued three federal prosecutors and an FBI agent who had allegedly violated their constitutional rights during a grand jury investigation in the northern
district of Florida. The suit was filed in the Federal District Court
for the District of Columbia, which was the official residence of
one of the defendants. 43 The three Florida defendants were
served by certified mail. These defendants moved for transfer to
37. See, e.g., Powelton Civic Home Onwers Ass'n v. Department of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
38. See Jacoby, The Effect of Recent Changes inthe Law of "'onstatutory "Judicial
Review, 53 GEO. L.J. 19, 41 (1964).
4.29, at 4-242 to -245. Presumably the
39. Id.; MOORE, supra note 11,
second federal officer, as an indispensable party, could be served under the 100
mile bulge provision of rule 4(f), but this is of limited utility since frequently the
absent federal officer is located in the District of Columbia. It should be noted
that the "bulge" provision was adopted in 1963, so that it did not exist at the
time of adoption of section 1391 (e). Of course, it would also be possible to use
the state's long-arm statute, but in 1962 the general venue statute required that
the suit be brought where all the defendants resided and not where the claim
arose. Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 388 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd inpart and revd in
part, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub non., Stafford v.
Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
40. H.R. REP. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961).
41. Id.at 2-3.
42. 569 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub non., Stafford v.
Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
43. The District of Columbia defendant was served within the district and
did not contest jurisdiction. Id. at 3 n. 11. Both the district court and court of
appeals denied this defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of absolute
prosecutorial immunity. Briggs v. Goodwin, 384 F. Supp. 1228 (D.D.C. 1974),
denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978).
aff'd, 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
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the northern district of Florida or, alternatively, for dismissal for
improper venue and insufficiency of process.
In reversing the district court's order of dismissal, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia began its analysis by
pointing out that section 1391 (e) was controlling, and that it provided that the district where one of the defendants resided was a
proper venue. 44 The court then considered whether extraterritorial service, as provided by the statute, presented any constitutional problems. The defendants argued that service was
improper because Congress did not intend nationwide service to
apply in a personal action for money damages against federal officials. They argued alternatively that if it did apply, then such ser45
vice was constitutionally deficient.
The court quickly disposed of the first argument by relying
on the categorical language of the section which did not provide
46
for any exceptions.
The court next considered the constitutional sufficiency of
the statute as applied. The defendants argued that it was unconstitutional to require their appearance in the District of Columbia
unless they had minimum contracts with that district. They
pressed the analogy of fourteenth amendment due process limitations on the assertion of state court jurisdiction and suggested
that similar limitations should apply in federal question cases.
The court of appeals also rejected this argument. In its view,
there was no basis for concluding that limitations placed on state
courts applied as well to congressional authorization of jurisdiction in federal courts. It felt that there was no magic to state
boundaries since Congress could redraw the federal districts at
anytime ignoring state lines-or even reducing the number of
federal courts, to "one . . . or a mere handful. ' 4 7 Thus, it rea44. 569 F.2d at 3-7. The district court's opinion was an unreported memorandum decision which is set out in some detail by the court of appeals. Id. at 3
n. 15. The court of appeals questioned why the district court did not reserve on
the question of transfer (which it denied) until it decided the motion to dismiss
so that it would have had the option to transfer at that point. The court found
support for this in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463. 466-67 (1962). 569
F.2d at 3 n.15. For a discussion of Goldlawr, see iinfoa note 216.
45. 569 F.2d at 4-7.
46. The court held that section 1391(e) was applicable to suits for money
damages against federal officials in their individual capacity if the official inflicted the injury "under color of legal authority" as opposed to simply a personal act. Id. at 5 & n.43. The United States Supreme Court ultimately reversed
on this point. See infra note 59.
47. 569 F.2d at 9 & n.72. The question has at least been raised as to
whether there is any significance to the fact that Congress has, with rare excep-
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soned, since there is no special significance to the boundaries of
districts, and since Congress could create a situation which would
necessitate nationwide service of process, it must have the power
to do so. As a result, it rejected the view of those courts which
had determined federal jurisdiction to be subject to the same
"fairness standard" as state court jurisdiction when service was
made outside the federal judicial district. 48 Implicit in this analy-

sis is the assumption that constitutional limitations on the assertion of federal jurisdiction are foreclosed because the assertion of
such jurisdiction is different than the assertion ofjurisdiction by a
state court.
A similar problem was faced in Driver v. Helms, 49 a class action
brought in the Rhode Island Federal District Court against various government officials who allegedly violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights by interfering with first class mail. Some of the
defendants, who neither resided in nor had any contacts with
Rhode Island, filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, insuf50
ficiency of process and lack of personal jurisdiction.
In a detailed opinion the district court denied the motions. It
concluded that Congress had authorized the assertion of personal
jurisdiction on a nationwide basis under the statute. The court
reasoned that the defendants were all within the United States
and since it was only asserting sovereignty, there was no extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction involved. This situation was
tion, chosen not to have districts cross state lines. P.

BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1106 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].

48. 569 F.2d at 9 & n.74. The court cited Fraley v.Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway Co., 397 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1968) and Lone Star Package Car Co. v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954) as examples of
courts applying a fairness test. It pointed out that Fraley relied on Lone Star and
the latter relied on United States v.Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795,
818 (1948) which had considered a fairness analysis in dealing with a nonresident British corporation. The Brigg's court stated that an attempt to assert jurisdiction over a defendant not within the United States is a different matter
from assertingjurisdiction over one within its borders. See infra text accompanying notes 87-89.
49. 74 F.R.D. 382 (D.R.I. 1977), aff d in part and revd in part, 577 F.2d 147
(1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nor., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527
(1980). Plaintiffs claimed violation of their rights under the first, fourth, fifth
and ninth amendments to the United States Constitution, and sought damages
and declaratory and injunctive relief. Subject matter jurisdiction was based on
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1339, 1343, 1361 (1982) and 5 U.S.C. § 702. 74 F.R.D. at
387.
50. The district court set up a procedure to deal with the preliminary motions and limited its opinion to the motions referred to in the text as well as
plaintiffs' motion to certify the class and a motion to dismiss defendant Clarence
Kelly, then Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 74 F.R.D. at 387.
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therefore distinct from that in which a state attempted to assert
jurisdiction over a party beyond its borders, or the United States
attempted to assert jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. As long
as the defendant is within the sovereign's territorial limits, all that
5
due process required was adequate notice. '
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit undertook consideration of the question of personal jurisdiction. 52 Appellants argued that section 1391(e) only dealt with
venue, not personal jurisdiction. They further argued that, if section 1391 (e) did authorize the assertion of personal jurisdiction, it
was unconstitutional to the extent that it applied to individuals
lacking minimum contacts with the state in which the court was
located. The court of appeals first concluded that section 1391 (e)
was a jurisdictional provision. 53 It then considered the question
of constitutional impediments to such an assertion ofjurisdiction.
The argument that minimum contacts were necessary to legitimize jurisdiction was rejected. Concurring with the district
court's view, the court of appeals concluded that contacts analysis
was only relevant when state courts were involved because a
state's sovereignty was circumscribed by its boundaries. But such
boundaries were irrelevant to federal assertions ofjurisdiction because the federal government's sovereignty is only limited by national borders. 54 Using language similar to that of the Briggs
court, the First Circuit pointed out that Congress could draw its
judicial districts anyway it wished, and therefore, federal court ju55
risdiction was not limited by state boundaries.
In response to appellant's argument regarding unfairness
and due process violations, the court indicated that federal officials have to accept this possibility of being sued in distant forums
51. Id. at 391 n.6.
52. 577 F.2d at 154-57. The First Circuit, however, first disposed of a
number of preliminary issues. The court concluded that section 139 1(e) did not

apply to former government officials, but only to current government olicials.
It also held that the section permitted personal damage actions. Id. at 149-54.
This latter point was the basis for reversal by the United States Suprene Coutt.
See iifra note 59.
53. The court pointed out that while the section was labeled "Venc." tile

language therein clearly allowed service by mail bevond tle territorial limits of
the state as an exception to the general provisions lor service provided in rule
4(1). The court also pointed out the legislative history which supported tile v.icw
of the section as a jurisdictional provision. 577 F.2d at 155-56. For a further
discussion see supra note 35.

54. 577 F.2d at 156 n.25.
55. Id. at 156-57.
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given the broad range of people affected by their official acts. 5"
In addition, the court felt that the district court's ability to transfer actions protected the defendants against any excessive burden. 5 7 The court felt that proper notice, reasonably calculated to

inform the defendant of the pendency of the action, was the only
due process limitation on Congress. The court found this requirement satisfied.

58

The United States Supreme Court reversed Briggs and Driver
on the grounds that section 1391(e) did not apply to actions for
money damages, and, therefore, the actions brought were not
proper under the statute. 5:) By basing its decision on a limiting
statutory construction, the majority avoided the need to discuss
the question of nationwide service of process. Justice Stewart dissenting, joined by Justice Brennan, made the only comment relevant to the jurisdictional question. He rejected the defendants'
contacts argument saying:
The short answer to this argument is that due process requires only certain minimum contacts between the
defendant and the sovereign that has created the court.
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186; InternationalShoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310. The issue is not whether it
is unfair to require a defendant to assume the burden of
litigating in an inconvenient forum, but rather whether
the court of a particular sovereign has power to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a named defendant. The cases
before us involved suits against residents of the United
States in the courts of the United States. No due process
problem exists.""
It is interesting to note that while the lower courts and Justice
Stewart are emphatic in stating that the presence of the defendant
within the sovereign's borders ends all due process considera56. Id.at 157. Butsee Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 544-45 (1980). Fora
discussion of S/afford, see infa note 208.
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982) (providing for transfer of actions).
58. In suppor of this the court cited Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138,
1143 (2d (ir. 1974). The court concluded that certified mail met this test. 577
F.2d at 157.
59. 444 '.S. 527, 540-45.
60. Id. at 554 (Stewart, J., dissenting); accord Leroy v.Great W. United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 192 (White, J., dissenting) (simply states conclusion that
there are "no restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States over its residents') (citing Fitzsimmons v. Barton.
589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979)).
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tions, except as to notice, they do not state any compelling reasons for this conclusion. It is arguable that due process
limitations on service of process should be concerned with factors
relating to fairness which go beyond sovereign power. 6' If this is
so, nationwide service of process would necessarily be subject to
greater restrictions than simply fair notice.
b.

The Federal Interpleader Act

The Federal Interpleader Act was originally passed by Congress to deal with situations in which insurance companies were
faced with multiple claims to the proceeds of a policy and the
claimants were located in different jurisdictions. 62 Since there
was no single jurisdiction which could obtain personal jurisdiction over all the necessary parties, it was impossible for the companies to use common-law interpleader procedure to avoid
potential multiple liability. 63 Congress solved this problem by allowing nationwide service of process in these cases. 6 4
In interpleader cases reaching the Supreme Court, the issue
of the constitutional power to exercise such nationwide service
has not yet been addressed. Thus, possible fifth amendment due
61. See i'fra text accompanying notes 107-58.
62. 3A J. MOORE, J. LuCAS & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL. PRACTICE
22.06 (2d ed. 1987). This statutory interpleader is distinct from interpleader
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 22 which provides for interpleader under state law
without the restrictions of the statute, but also without the benefits of nationwide service of process. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S.
523, 528 n.3 (1967); MOORE, supra,
22.13 at 22-120, 22.04[2.-2] at 22-33.
63. When all the claimants live in a single jurisdiction so that personaljurisdiction could be obtained over them, interpleader permits the so-called stakeholder to sue them all in either state or federal court. The stakeholder may then
deposit the funds in court and all the claimants are enjoined from suing the
stakeholder. The claimants then litigate amongst themselves the question of entitlement to the fund. See generallV Hazard & Moskovitz, Ani Historical and Critical
Analysis of Intepleader, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 706 (1964). The Supreme Court decided shortly before the adoption of the statute that in rei and qnasi in rei jurisdiction could not be used to bind nonresidents in interpleader. New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916); see generally Seeburger, The Fe'derallonlgArm: The Uses of Diversity, or 'Tain'l So. McGee, 10 IND. L. REV. 480, 495-500
(1977).
64. The statutory requirements for nationwide service of process are
(1)that there be $500 at stake, (2) that at least two of the adverse claimants be of
diverse citizenship, and (3) that the plaintiff deposit the fund with the court
clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982). In addition, the action must be brought in a
judicial district where at least one of the claimants resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1397. If
these requirements are met then process may be served in anYx judicial district
where a claimant resides, without limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2361. Whether process could be served on nonresidents of the United States has been left open by
the Supreme Court. State Farm Fire & Casualtv Co. v.Tashire, 386 U.S. 52,3.
537 n.18 (1967).
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process limitations on its use are still an open question. 6 5 As indicated in the earlier discussion, it seems clear that Congress has
the power to authorize this broad jurisdictional scope, so the fact
that this question of power has not been raised in the context of
interpleader is not surprising. 66 But the absence of any real discussion of the due process question does not negate the existence
of due process concerns. There has been no conclusive statement
on this question. It can be argued, therefore, as Justice Stewart
suggested in his dissent in Briggs, 67 that as long as the defendants
have minimum contacts with the United States there is no due
process problem in as much as the "particular sovereign" has
power over them. However, one might also argue that due process requires a reasonably convenient forum when the multistate
nature of the underlying controversy necessitates appearance in a
forum with little, if any, connection with certain defendants. At a
minimum, such an argument plays off due process interests
against interests in the economy and consistency in the resolution
of controversies. 68 As indicated above, 6 9 the purpose of the Interpleader Act was to deal with situations in which no one court
could otherwise obtain jurisdiction over all of the parties. In the
absence of a statute, a stakeholder would be faced with the possibility of multiple lawsuits and the consequent substantial risk of
inconsistent results. In such cases resolution of the problem necessitates that some claimants must be subjected to jurisdiction in
a district in which they would not normally have to appear. But
since this is a special type of case and since at least one claimant
must reside in the district where the suit is filed, there is an essential pragmatic fairness which appears to justify the assertion of
jurisdiction. Such an analysis would allow for the continued use
of nationwide service of process in interpleader, while establish65. The interpleader cases reaching the Court were State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308
U.S. 66 (1939); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Rilev, 302 U.S. 292 (1937); Dugas v. American Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 414 (1937); Sanders v.Armour Fertilizer
Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934); Levinson v. United States, 258 U.S. 198 (1922).
The question of nationwide service of process was alluded to, but not discussed,
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in 7lshire.
Tashire v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 363 F.2d 7, 10 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd,
386 U.S. 523 (1967); see generall Seeburger, supra note 63. at 484-85 & 493-502.
66. AII S-ruDV, supra note 26.
67. See stpa text accompanying note 60.
68. See Foster, supra note 7,at 30-31; Hazard, hilerstate Voem', 74 Nw. U.L.
REv. 711, 717-18 (1979); Travnor, Is This Caflict Realy Veressa'?, 37 TiEx. L.
REV. 657, 663 (1959).

69. See stipra notes 62-63.
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17

ing a more flexible test for consideration of this question in other
1
T
contexts.
c.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934

The Securities Exchange Act of 193471 was adopted by Congress in response to demands for regulation of the abuses in the
securities market. 72 Section 27 of the Act 73 provides for exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction in federal district courts for suits under
the Act. The section then goes on to provide, in relevant part:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created
by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to
enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant
or transacts business, and process in such cases may be
served in any other district of which the defendant is an
74
inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.
The meaning of this language as a basis for nationwide service of process has been considered numerous times. 75 The
courts have generally agreed that this section provides for nationwide service, and that Congress can authorize such assertions of
jurisdiction. 76 Having reached these conclusions, courts have
gone on to consider the due process implications of such assertions of jurisdiction.
In Mariash v. Morrill,7 7 the plaintiff filed suit in the Southern
District of New York against a number of Massachusetts defendants who were involved in selling shares in Viatron Corporation
70. See infra text accompanying notes 193-98.

71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78KK (1982).
72. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 784-85 (2d ed. 1961). The act attempts to regulate these excesses in four ways. "Every non-exempt security

listed on an exchange must be registered by its issuer. Periodic reports must be
filed thereafter. The solicitation of proxies must comply with the Commission's
rules. And there are certain controls over insider-trading practices." Id. at 785.
For a brief introduction to the Act and its amendments see R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SECURITIES REGUIATION CASES AND MATERIAI.S 441-48 (5th ed. 1982).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).

74. Id.
75. E.g., International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.).
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp.
1114 (1). Mass. 1978); Garner v. Enright, 71 F.R.D. 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). See
itfra note 83.
76. See cases cited suna note 75.
77. 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974).
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as part of a private placement exempt from registration under the
Securities Act of 1933.78 The complaint alleged that the defendants had conspired to favor one of the defendants over the plaintiff in the delivery of an opinion letter, thus making it impossible
for the plaintiff to sell his shares. 79 This was alleged to be a violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193480 and
therefore nationwide service of process was authorized under section 27. Among the defendants were eleven members of the law
firm who had been Viatron's Boston attorneys. 8 '
These eleven defendants moved to dismiss on a variety of
grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction. The district
court rejected the plaintiff's view that section 27 was a basis for
personal jurisdiction, viewing it only as a provision governing
subject matter jurisdiction and venue.8 2 The district court also
concluded that personal jurisdiction had not been established
under the New York long-arm statute and so dismissed the action
as to that group.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit began by pointing out that section 27 did provide for
nationwide service of process whenever a claim is stated under
the Act.13 The court then went on to consider whether there was
any limit to this assertion ofjurisdiction. In its view the assertion
of nationwide service was limited by the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. 8 4 But it concluded that all that due process required was notice reasonably calculated to inform the defendants
78. Section 77e requires the registration of any security sold in interstate
commerce and section 771(2) exempts transactions which do not involve a public offer. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77d(2) (1982).
79. Plaintiff needed the opinion letter in order to release his shares from
the restrictions of the private placement. It was alleged that this was delayed so
that defendant Burwick could put his substantial holdings in Viatron on the market first. When the plaintiff finally attempted to sell the shares he was informed
that the presence of these other shares on the market would make it difficult to
sell the plaintiff's shares. 496 F.2d at 1141.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
81. Originally twelve members of the firm were sued, but the dismissal of
one was stipulated by the parties. 496 F.2d at 1141, 1142 n.5.
82. This was an unreported opinion which Judge Kaufman only alludes to
in his own opinion. Id. at 1140.
83. Id. at 1142-43. The court indicated that it did not need to consider
whether there was personal jurisdiction under New York law because section 27
authorized nationwide service of process. In the court's view it was simply "too
late in the day" to argue otherwise and found support for this view in International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974) and Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). Id.
84. 496 F.2d at 1143. See supra note 20.
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of the action so that they would have an opportunity to be
heard. 8 5 Since there was no dispute over the notice given to the
defendants, the court concluded that due process had been
satisfied.
In response to the defendants' argument that due process
also required "minimal contacts" with the state where the district
court sat, the court said that such a test was irrelevant to an assertion of jurisdiction by the United States. It stated:
It is not the State of New York but the United States
"which would exercise its jurisdiction over them [the defendants]." And plainly, where, as here, the defendants
reside within the territorial boundaries of the United
States, the "minimal contacts," required to justify the
federal government's exercise of power over them, are
present. Indeed, the "minimal contacts" principle does
not, in our view, seem particularly relevant in evaluating
the constitutionality of in personam jurisdiction based
on nationwide, but not extraterritorial, service of process. It is only the latter, quite simply, which even raises
a question of the forum's power to assert control over
s6
the defendant.
In so reasoning, the court sought to clarify an earlier Second
Circuit opinion, Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp. v. Maxwell.8 7
In that case, also a section 10(b) action, personal jurisdiction was
also based on section 27. The court used a minimum contacts
analysis to decide whether due process had been satisfied. The
Mariash court explained that this was not because such an analysis
was necessary in all actions under section 27, but rather because
the foreign defendants were not "present" within the United
States. 8 As such the question was one of extraterritorial service
beyond the borders of the United States. Therefore, the Leasco
court felt it necessary to determine whether the foreign defendants had sufficient connection with the United States to warrant
an assertion of jurisdiction." '
85. 496 F.2d at 1143. In support of this proposition the court simply cited,
without explanation, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 245 (1958); Walker v.

City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
86. 496 F.2d at 1143 (emphasis supplied by the court) (footnotes omitted).

87. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir 1972).
88. 496 F.2d at 1143 n.9.
89. 468 F.2d at 1340; accord Iii re Fotochrome, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 26, 29
(E.D.N.Y. 1974), qJ/'d, 517 F.2d 512 (1975).
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A similar view on this issue was taken by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Fitzsimmons v. Barton.90
The court of appeals reviewed a dismissal by the district court of a
nonresident defendant in a securities fraud action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on the grounds that he lacked sufficient contacts with Illinois to satisfy its long-arm statute. 9 ' The
court of appeals began by pointing out that section 27 provided
for nationwide service, and therefore the Illinois statute did not
have to be considered.9 2 Having reached this conclusion, the
court considered whether there were any restraints placed on this
service by the due process clause. The court concluded that
under the reasoning of Shaffer v. Heitner 93 and InternationalShoe Co.
v. Washington94 a "fairness" standard was to be applied in reviewing all assertions of jurisdiction. However, it went on to say that
this "fairness" related to the "exercise of power by a particular
sovereign, not the fairness of imposing the burdens of litigating
in a distant forum." 9 5 Based on this test the court felt that the
assertion of jurisdiction was fair since the defendant was a resident of the United States and therefore had sufficient contacts
with the "particular sovereign" seeking to exercise power over
him. 9 1 In rejecting the idea that fairness, for jurisdictional pur90. 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
91. Id. at 332. The district court decision was unreported.
92. The court stated that rule 4(e) authorizes the use of the law of the state
in which the district court sits when no United States statute provides for manner of service. Since Congress had authorized service, then under rule 4(e) that
is sufficient, and no reference to state law was necessary. 589 F.2d at 332. If an
action is brought pursuant to a federal statute which does not provide for service
of process then it would be necessary to resort to a special provision such as rule
4(f) or to the law of the state in which the district court sits to accomplish service
outside that state's borders. E.g-. Volk Corp. v. Art-Pak Clip Art Serv., 432 F.
Supp. 1179, 1181 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). For a further discussion, see supra note
17.
93. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
94. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
95. 589 F.2d at 333. The court recognized that both Shaffer and hiteriatiooal
Shoe were cases dealing with state court jurisdiction, but felt that the broad articulation of a fairness standard should be applied to all such assertions. Id. at 332.
96. The court found additional support for its method of analysis in the
older cases approving of Congress' power to require a defendant to appear in
any court of the United States when she has been served within its borders. It
cited Imnphree, 326 U.S .438 (1946); Robertsoni 268 U.S. 619 (1925); United States
v. Union Pacific R.R., 98 U.S. 569 (1878); and it also cited Mariash, 496 F.2d
1138 as supportive in the context of section 27. Id. at 333-34. Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit has held that minimum contacts with the United States is all that is
required under section 27 of the Securities Act of 1934. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1985). There the court Concluded defendants who were residents of the United States had sufficient
minimmn contacts to be subject to personal jurisdiction in any federal district
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poses, also related to the imposition of the burden of litigating in
a particular forum, it said that such concerns could be dealt with
7
in the context of deciding questions of change of venue9
In so ruling, the court disapproved of the "fairness" test relating to the burden of litigating in a particular forum which had
been set out in Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp.98 by a
district court in denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under section 27. The Fitzsimmons court viewed such a "fairness" test as irrelevant to the question of a particular sovereign
exercising power; rather it viewed fairness as pertinent to questions of the convenience of the forum for purposes of venue." ' It
stated that these factors were relevant to the "non-jurisdictional
doctrine offorum non conveniens," and that they were therefore inappropriate to determine the constitutionality of personal
jurisdiction. 0 0
The cases which have considered the question of nationwide
service under section 27 have recognized that the fifth amendment does place limitations on Congress' power to authorize nacourt, but remanded the question of whether a defendant who was not a resident
of the United States has sufficient contacts with the United States to make it
reasonably foreseeable that it would be subjected to suit in the United States. Id.
at 1316.
97. The court viewed these questions as relating to the issue of forum non
conveniens in considering motions for change of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). Id. at 334.
98. 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974). That court set out five factors as
relevant to its fairness analysis. Id. at 203-04. For a further discussion, see infra
text accompanying notes 190-92.
99. 589 F.2d at 334 n.5.
100. Id. at 334 & n.5. In that footnote, the court criticized the Oxford First
court for not simply applying its factors to the concept offorum non convelnems. It
then stated:
Oxford First considered this argument and rejected it on the ground that
it avoids the issue of constitutional restrictions. 372 F. Supp. at 203
n.24. However, if these factors are of constitutional significance, an issue that we do not decide, we do not understand why they would be any
less so because applied under the rubric offorum non conveniems instead
of personal jurisdiction.
Id. at 334 n.5. This statement by the court seems to misperceive the problem
before it. It assumes that concepts of fairness are irrelevant to personal jurisdiction because they have always been considered under the doctrine offormi )oni
conveniens. Such a sharp distinction between these concepts does not appearjustified for the reasons indicated in the next section of this article. See iifra text
accompanying notes 161-73. In addition, to avoid the question of the constitutional significance of a fairness concept, under whatever rubric, is to beg the
question. As long as such factors do not have constitutional significance, courts
will continue to exercise broad discretion in deciding to hold, transfer or dismiss
a case with only limited appellate review. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 508 (1947).
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tionwide service of process. While a due process standard of
fairness has been suggested by some courts,""i the trend in authority seems to be that due process only requires adequate notice. In turn this principle is based on the fact that the minimum
contacts test developed in cases such as InternationalShoe, 112 Hanson v. Denckla 1113 and Shaffer v. Heitner 104 is relevant only in determining whether a particular sovereign can assert jurisdiction.
Thus, in considering state court jurisdiction, the question is relevant in determining the constitutionality of such assertions beyond state borders. In cases based on nationwide service of
process, it would be relevant only in cases involving defendants
101. E.g., Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191
(E.D. Pa. 1974). A number of other courts have suggested this. For example, in
United States exrel. Armstrong v. Wheeler, 321 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1970), the
court concluded that section 1391(e) authorized the assertion of personal jurisdiction in a habeas corpus proceeding for discharge from the army. But it went
on to say that it was still necessary to determine if the defendant had "sufficient
contacts with this district such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play." Id. at 478. A federal district court sitting in
Iowa came to the conclusion that a defendant had to have sufficient contacts with
Iowa to comport with due process even where jurisdiction was based on section
27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366
F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Iowa, C.D. 1973). However that court reached its result because it felt bound by Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.
1973), which came to that conclusion in a section 27 suit against a Canadian
corporation not present in the United States. As we have already seen the assertion of jurisdiction over defendants who are either not citizens of, or are not
found in, the United States has received different treatment. A fairness test was
also considered in general terms by the court, in Dijulio v. Digicon, Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 963 (D. Md. 1971), in an action where jurisdiction was asserted both
under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Dijulo was disagreed with by the court, in Stern v. Gobelofl, 332 F. Supp. 909 (D.
Md. 1971), but the court added that even if Dijulio was correct the defendant in
Stern had sufficient contacts with the district for a suit under the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Finally, in Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Cal. 1976), which was a class action under section
1391(e) seeking relief for the CIA's opening of mail intended for the Soviet
Union, the court stated that section 1391(e) provided a mechanism for effective
service but it was still necessary to decide if the assertion of jurisdiction comported with due process. In support of this it cited, inter alia, United States ex rel.
Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 918 (1969).
Having stated this, the court seems to have decided sub silentio that it was obliged
to determine whether jurisdiction could be asserted under the California longarm statute and minimum contacts. 422 F. Supp. at 871.
It should be noted that subsequent to the decisions in Wheeler and Rudick the
United States Supreme Court decided that section 1391 (e) did not extend jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases. Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4
(1971). It is necessary that the "custodian" defendant be present or have contacts with the district in which suit is brought. Id. at 490-91; Strait v. Laird, 406
U.S. 341, 345 n.2 (1972).
102. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
103. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
104. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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located outside the United States. But when defendants reside
within the United States the necessity of requiring more than ade1°5
quate notice does not exist.
In reaching this conclusion, these courts seemed to have focused exclusively on the power aspect ofjurisdiction, while failing
to consider how concepts of territorial sovereignty have been supplemented by principles of fairness and convenience in the state
court personal jurisdiction area. 10 6 This latter movement suggests that the concept of due process is broad enough to encompass a fairness analysis even where sovereign power exists. The
next section will consider why such an analysis is appropriate in
the area of nationwide service of process. Once this proposition
is established consideration will be given to the factors relevant to
deciding the fairness of assertions of jurisdiction in this area.
III.

A

SUGGESTED ANALYSIS

The difficulty with the "power focused" analysis in this area
is that concepts of fairness are invariably equated with power over
the defendant in considering the due process ramifications of extraterritorial service of process.10 7 Once it is determined that the
defendant is within the sovereign's power, courts have assumed
that there is no due process limitation on requiring such a defendant to appear in a particular court.' 08 This is a most grudging application of the concept of due process in the area of
personal jurisdiction. The justification for this ungenerous application of due process is found in the assumption that a "minimum
contacts" approach to jurisdictional questions is only relevant to
the power of sovereign states to act beyond their borders. I09
However, the Supreme Court has frequently emphasized that
the due process limitations on state court jurisdiction are intended to function not solely as limitations on sovereign power,
105. E.g., Maiash, 496 F.2d at 1143
106. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen
(1980); Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d
(1976); see HART & WECHSLER, sulpra note

nn.8 & 9.
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352
47, at 1106. For a further discussion,

see infra text accompanying notes 110-39.

107. E.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1340 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting that although Exchange Act authorized service of

process anywhere, it did not do so beyond bounds of due process which in this
case meant fair notice of suit).
108. E.g., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). For a discussion of this point in the context of the Mandamus and Venue
Act of 1962, see supra text accompanying notes 45-61.

109. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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but also to ensure that the defendant receives the protection of a
fair forum.
A.

State CourtJurisdiction Cases

In order to understand the nature of these dual functions, it
will be helpful to briefly review the development of these concepts in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Beginning with Pennoyer
v. NeffI I the Supreme Court established that assertions of jurisdiction were to be limited by the due process clause and that in
order to establish jurisdiction a tribunal must be able to assert
physical power within the territorial limits of the state.''' This
standard remained the hallmark of jurisdictional limitations for
the next sixty-eight years. In this period, however, many situations arose in which a strict "power" principle did not provide a
satisfactory resolution of jurisdictional questions, especially in a
society increasingly confronted with conflicts between parties
from different states.' 12 It was during this period that the Court
developed a number of fictions to justify the assertion of jurisdiction within the framework of a "power" analysis.' 13
Finally, in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington '4 the Court attempted to revamp its analysis to deal with this situation. In that
case the question was whether the defendant, a Delaware corporation based in Missouri, was amenable to suit in the State of
110. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). For an analysis of the period prior to Pennover, see
Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In PersonamJurisdction of
State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHi. L. REV. 569, 56970 (1958); Hazard, A General Theory of State-CourtJurisdiction,1965 Sup. CT. REV.
241, 252-62 (P. Kurland ed.).
111. 95 U.S. at 720-22; Clermont, Restating TerritorialJurisdictionand Venue
for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 414-15 (1981). Technically,
the holding in Pennoyer was that the state court judgment was to be denied full
faith and credit, but its dicta clearly established the due process clause as controlling in this area, though it was not applicable to the case before the Court.
Kurland, supra note 110, at 572.
112. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
113. Thus, for example, in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the Court
upheld the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident motorist who had been
involved in an automobile accident in the forum state by the fiction that he had
consented by his actions to the appointment of an agent within the jurisdiction
for service of process, thus making him present and subject to the power of the
tribunal. See also Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman. 294 US. 623 (1935). The
Supreme Court ultimately recognized the fictive nature of "consent," Olberding
v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953), as well as other fictions based
on "presence." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317
(1945). An excellent summary of this period in the development of a due process analysis by the Court may be found in Kurland, supra note 110, at 573-86.
114. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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Washington to collect payments owed to Washington's unemployment compensation fund. The Court, speaking through
ChiefJustice Stone, began by rejecting the need for physical presence in the state as the sole means of asserting jurisdiction:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to renderjudgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power
over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within
the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to
its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff .... But now that the capias ad respondendum
has given way to personal service of summons or other
form of notice, due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be
not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." 1 15
While the Court suggested a new basis for personal jurisdiction in
terms of the now familiar concept of "minimum contacts" and
"fair play and substantial justice," the opinion created difficulties
because this new standard was abstract, amorphous and difficult
to define in the concrete instance.1 16 At some points the Court
focused on "minimum contacts" indicating that a key question
was the defendant's activities in the forum and how they related
to the cause of action. 11 7 At other times, it spoke in broad
terms about reasonableness 1 8 and "'estimate[s]
of the
inconveniences.' "1 19
As a result, it was unclear what precise test was to be used by
courts in resolving jurisdictional questions. However, it was clear
115. Id. at 316 (citation omitted).
116. The amorphous nature of the majority's standard led Justice Black to
file a separate opinion decrying the use of "elastic standards" such as "fair
play," "justice" and "reasonableness" which might unduly limit the power of
states to assert jurisdiction. Id. at 325; Kurland, supra note 110, at 590.
117. 326 U.S. at 317-19; Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in
Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 64 (1977); Clermont, supra note 111, at
415-16; Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. and Jurisdiction Over Individuals, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV.

285, 287-88 (1958).
118. 326 U.S. at 320.
119. Id.at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139,
141 (2d Cir. 1930)). As Professor Kurland has suggested, InternationalShoe may
have "served rather to destroy existent doctrine than to establish new criteria for
the Supreme Court and other courts to follow." Kurland, supra note 110, at 586.
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that "fairness" was to be a term in the equation. In the next several years the Court decided a number of cases which appeared to
increase the emphasis on "fairness" in deciding jurisdictional
questions. In particular, this was suggested by the Supreme
Court's opinion in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 120 In
McGee, a California resident sought to assert jurisdiction in California over a Texas insurance company for recovery on an insurance policy issued by the defendant to her son. The only contacts
the defendant had with California were an agreement, sent by
mail, to insure the defendant and the acceptance of premium payments, mailed from California by the defendant.' 2 1 In concluding
that, consistent with due process, California could assert jurisdiction over the defendant, the Court focused its analysis on balancing the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the state to
decide whether the assertion of jurisdiction was reasonable. As
the Court stated:
It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These
residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were
120. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In the period between InternationalShoe and IcGee the Court decided three cases which were consistent with the development
of a concern for fairness. In Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S.
643 (1950), Justice Black, speaking for four justices concluded in an opinion, in
which Justice Douglas concurred, that the defendant was subject to jurisdiction
to regulate its advertising and sale of insurance to citizens of Virginia. In the
course of the opinion Justice Black, in dicta, suggested that factors such as convenience of the plaintiff and the state's interest in asserting jurisdiction were
relevant to its analysis. Id. at 648-49. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the Court approved the assertion ofjurisdiction
of New York over all claimants to common trust funds located in New York
based on the need of the state to administer and close these trusts without focusing on defendants' activities. Id. at 312-13. In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), the Court said it would be consistent with due
process for Ohio to assert jurisdiction over a corporation created under the laws
of the Philippines, which operated in Ohio during the Japanese occupation of
the Philippines, for an action relating to events occurring outside of Ohio. The
opinion states that continuous business activity in the state is enough for due
process. Id. at 445-46.
121. 355 U.S. at 221-22. Upon the insured's death, and the defendant's
refusal to pay on the policy, his mother sued in California state court to recover
under the policy. California based jurisdiction on its statute which subjected
foreign corporations to suits based on insurance contracts with residents. Judgment was obtained in California. When it could not be collected there, the
plaintiff sought to enforce it in Texas, which was the defendant's principal place
of business. Texas refused to enforce thejudgment stating it was void under the
fourteenth amendment. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 288 S.W.2d 579
(Tex. Civ. App., 1956).
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forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State
in order to hold it legally accountable. When claims
were small or moderate individual claimants frequently
could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the company judgment proof. Often the crucial witnesses-as here on the
company's defense of suicide-will be found in the insured's locality. Of course there may be inconvenience
to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California
where it had this contract but certainly nothing which
122
amounts to a denial of due process.
To the extent that this language suggests that questions of
jurisdiction are to be resolved by balancing all interests to determine a fair forum, 12 3 it was undercut a year later by the Court's
decision in Hanson v. Denckla.124 The Court in Hanson ruled that
Florida could not assert jurisdiction over a Delaware trust company in a suit involving the validity of a power of appointment
under a trust. ChiefJustice Warren, speaking for the majority in a
5-4 decision, made it clear that territorial power was still a key
issue in any due process analysis:
[T]he requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v.
Neff... to the flexible standard of InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington .... Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations
on the power of respective States. However minimal the
burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant
may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the
"minimal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite
25
to its exercise of power over him.'
122. 355 U.S. at 223-24.
123. In summarizing this period, Professor Kurland has said:
From InternationalShoe to InternationalLife, the Supreme Court had
evolved a doctrine of non-interference with the exercise of jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants by state courts. By use of the "fairness"
test, suggested by Mr. Chief Justice Stone in derivation from Judge
Learned Hand, the Court had made the question of the propriety of
such personal jurisdiction a matter of fact which, for all practical purposes, was not reviewable in the Supreme Court.
Kurland, supra note 110, at 610.
124. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
125. Id. at 251. The Court not only emphasized the importance of power,
but also appeared to resurrect the importance of categorization of actions as in
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While the opinion has been criticized by commentators as a retrogressive approach to jurisdiction based on unclear reasoning, '2 it
is at least fair to say that, as the language quoted above suggests,
the opinion does not reject the significance of a "fairness" analysis, but rather seeks to reenforce the importance of sovereign
power as a key element in ascertaining the limitations on state
court jurisdiction. 1 27 Having made that point, but having not resolved the relationship of "power" and "fairness" in this area, the
Court remained silent on the issue for almost twenty years.
Finally, in Shaffer v. Heitner 128 the Court decided the first in a
series of cases which attempted to clarify the elements of a due
process analysis. In Shaffer the Court rejected the assertion ofjurisdiction by Delaware over nonresident directors of a Delaware
corporation in a derivative action. The Court's most important
and significant statement in Shaffer was that "all assertions of
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny." 129 However,
the Court also sought to evaluate whether assertions of jurisdiction could be justified by examining "the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation."' 1 30

Implicit in this ap-

proach was a recognition that both "power" and "fairness" were
relevant to a jurisdictional analysis.13 ' Similarly, in Kulko v. Supenor Court 132 the Court recognized the relevance of "power" and
"fairness" in this area when it rejected California's assertion of

13 3
jurisdiction over a nonresident father in a child support case.

rem, quasi in rert and in personam. This was after having appeared to reject the
significance of these categories in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950).
126. E.g., Clermont, supra note 111, at 419; Hazard, supra note 110, at 244.
127. The majority's disagreement with the dissent is that the latter, in an
opinion written by Justice Black, would focus on the reasonableness of the forum as the key to deciding state court jurisdiction. 357 U.S. at 259. Interestingly, both sides sought support from the language of the International Shoe
opinion, which only means that that opinion raised both criteria as relevant to a
due process analysis without clarifying their relationship. See supra text accompanying notes 116-19.
128. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
129. Id. at 212.
130. 1d. at 204.
131. Clermont, supra note 111, at 421 n.55. At least one judge has viewed
Shaffer as central to a revised analysis of nationwide service cases because of its
"abandonment of territorial sovereignty strictures" in a due process analysis.
Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 828 (6th Cir. 1981) (Keith, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1981).
132. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
133. Id. at 92.
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The Court concluded that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts
with California to assert control over him,' 3 4 and thus it did not
consider other interests which might have been relevant to the
3 5
fairness of the forum.1
The Court reenforced and made the relationship between
"power" and "fairness" explicit in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson. 1 36 In that case Oklahoma sought to assert jurisdiction
over two New York corporations neither of which did business in
Oklahoma. These defendants were involved in the sale of an automobile in New York to the plaintiffs who were then residents of
New York. Subsequently the plaintiffs left New York and were
involved in an accident in Oklahoma in which the vehicle burned.
They filed a products liability suit in Oklahoma against, among
others, the two New York corporations, who then moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court refused to overturn a denial of this motion by the trial
court.' 37 In reversing this decision, Justice White, speaking for
six Justices, began by asserting the dual purposes of a minimum
contacts-due'process analysis:
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen
to perform two related, but distinguishable functions. It
protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating
in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure
that the States, through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as co38
equal sovereigns in a federal system.1
After analyzing these functions in general terms, the Court concluded by stating that even a convenient state forum does not
comport with due process if the state lacks "power" over the defendants since the due process clause acts as an "instrument of
interstate federalism."' l3 9 If, as the Court suggests, the functions
of sovereign power and fairness are related, and overreaching the
134. Id. at 101.
135. Id. at 98-101.
136. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
137. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla.
1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
138. 444 U.S. at 291-92.
139. Id. at 294. The Court reiterated this in a companion case to lloodson
which was decided the same day. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980);
Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C. L.
REv. 407, 421 (1980).
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limits of sovereignty warrants a denial ofjurisdiction, then should
it not follow that a violation of norms of fairness also warrant a
denial of jurisdiction?
The Court has shown an increased willingness to focus its
attention on the "fairness" issue in analyzing jurisdiction questions. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee 140 this point was made clear in its review of a decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 14 1 The
Court of Appeals in Bauxites had affirmed a district court decision 142 to impose a sanction under rule 37(b)(2). The sanction,
which established personal jurisdiction over a defendant, had
been ordered by the district court for failure to provide discovery
on the issue ofjurisdiction as had been ordered. In the process of
affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, Justice White
pointed out that personal jurisdiction placed "a restriction onjudicial power.., as a matter of individual liberty," and was therefore waivable.14 3 In a footnote he sought to clarify the underlying
concerns which govern personal jurisdiction and the application
of due process:
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of
personal jurisdiction, as applied to state courts, reflects
an element of federalism and the character of state sovereignty vis- -vis other states. . . . The restriction on
state sovereign power described in World- Wide Volkswagen
Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of
the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself
makes no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore,
if the federalism concept operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would
not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement .... 144
Bauxites takes a step beyond Woodson in that it emphasizes the
Court's willingness to focus on the concept of fairness or an "individual liberty interest" as the ultimate concern of the due pro140. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
141. Compagnie des Bauxites v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir.
1981), aft'd, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
142. The opinion of the district court was unreported.
143. 456 U.S. at 702-03 & n.10.
144. Id. at 702-03 n.10.
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cess clause. The opinion makes it clear that simply focusing on
the traditional federalism questions of "power" and "sovereignty" is not adequate in analyzing questions of personal jurisdiction. Those questions are not the ones with which the due
process clause is concerned. Since due process ultimately
touches individual liberty interests, it follows that these interests
cannot be swept away without consideration when "power" is not
at issue as, for example, in the typical nationwide service cases.
The Court once against emphasized the importance of fairness over and above issues of power in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz.' 45 In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, 14 6 the
Court addressed the individual liberty interests which the due
process clause seeks to protect and delineated the factors relevant
to protecting those interests.147 The Court stated that traditional
minimum contacts were necessary to establish the defendants' tie
with the forum much in the way the Court had required in Hanson
and Woodson, 14 8 but, at the same time, it also emphasized the importance of fairness factors once minimum contacts are established.' 49 As the Court stated:
Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum
State, these contacts may be considered in light of other
factors to determine whether the assertion of personal
jurisdiction would comport with "fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington ....
Thus courts in "appropriate case[s]" may evaluate "the
burden on the defendant," "the forum State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute," "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief," "the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies," and the "shared interest of
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
....
These considerations sometimes serve to establish
145. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
146. It is interesting to note that Justice Brennan had written strong dissents in earlier cases. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 299 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. See 471 U.S. at 471-72 & n.13 (citing Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie de Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. at 702-03 n.10 (1982)).
148. Id. at 474-76.
149. Id. at 476-78.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33: p. I

the reasonableness ofjurisdiction upon a lesser showing
of minimum contacts than would otherwise be reOn the other hand, where a defendant who
quired ....
purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents
seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations
150
would render jurisdiction unreasonable.
It is clear that the Court has reinforced the view that due process is concerned with more than questions of sovereign power,
and that in deciding personal jurisdiction questions in the state
court context the fairness to the defendant, i.e., the defendant's
individual liberty interests, is of central importance in determining personal jurisdiction even when the forum has sufficient connections to justify an exertion of sovereign power.
B.

Application to NationwideJurisdiction Cases

Such an analysis in the state court jurisdiction area must be
given serious consideration in the analogous area of nationwide
jurisdiction cases. In the nationwide service of process cases,
courts have correctly pointed out that a minimum contacts-due
process analysis which serves to limit coequal sovereigns is not
relevant to the power to assert jurisdiction within the United
States. 1 5 ' They have also recognized that such an analysis,
adapted from the state court jurisdiction analogue, is relevant to
assertions of jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits of the
United States.' 52 Once attention is focused on assertions ofjurisdiction within the United States, however, it is inconsistent to
conclude that a minimum contacts-due process approach can be
discarded because, as the Supreme Court has pointed out, a separate function of that approach is to protect defendants from unfair
and distant litigation. Since both of these functions must be satisfied to comport with due process, it is clear that the fair forum
function must be established in order for there to be a proper
150. Id. at 476-77 (citations omitted). The concern of the Court for the
fairness of the forum was the basis for its judgment in Asahi Metal Industry v.
Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987), that it would violate due process for
California to assert jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer. While the Court
divided evenly on the issue of minimum contacts, eight Justices agreed that it
would violate due process to assert jurisdiction because it would be an unfair
and unreasonable forum. Id. at 1033-35.
151. E.g., Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974).
152. E.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326
(2d Cir. 1972).
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assertion of jurisdiction. 5 3
This is particularly so in light of the Court's recognition in
Bauxites that all of the restrictions that due process requires are
intended to protect individual liberty interests of the defendant.
If individual liberty, or fairness, is the key, then whether or not
the defendant is within the sovereign's boundaries, and therefore
subject to its sovereign power, she is entitled to protection from
an unfair choice of forum. It is illogical to contend that a person
is protected from an unreasonable choice of forum only if she is a
defendant not subject to the sovereign's power; but once such
person is so subject, the due process clause would give no protection against an arbitrary and inconvenient choice of forum. Thus,
if a defendant lived in New Jersey and had no contacts with California, but was sued in California state court, the due process
clause would protect her from the burden of defending in that
distant forum. But if the suit were based on a violation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the due process clause would
not protect her even if it were an unreasonable choice of forum. 15 4 The defendant's only hope would be to convince the
court to grant a transfer.' 5 5
It might be argued that such a result is correct because Congress, in adopting certain remedial statutes, had decided that it is
of paramount importance to protect the potential plaintiffs even if
such protection results in greatly inconveniencing the party who
must defend far from home.i 5 6 But this is only to accept the principle that Congress has the power to authorize nationwide service
153. 444 U.S. at 293-94; Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct.
1026, 1033-35 (1987).
154. Following the logic of those courts which suggest that due process
only requires fair notice in suits in which service is based on nationwide service
of process, it would also seem that any assertion ofjurisdiction by a federal court
would only be limited by a fair notice test. Thus, if Corporation A were sued on
a federal question in a federal court located in State X and service was accomplished under FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3) by serving an agent of the corporation who
was transiently present in the state taking a train through State X to State 1', due
process would not require a denial ofjurisdiction even if the corporation had no
other connection with State X. Such a result is compelled by a rejection of a
fairness due process standard when there is power over the defendant. But see
supra note 17. See also Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction: The
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956). A different result
may ensue if service is based on a state long-arm statute pursuant to Rule 4(e).
See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV.

L.

REV.

1121, 1123 n.6 (1966).

155. E.g., Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 1978), rev d on other
grounds sub nom., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
156. E.g., Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D. Md. 1971).
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of process.1 57 Such congressional power is still limited by fifth
amendment due process considerations. The real question is the
nature of that due process limitation when sovereign power is not
involved. In light of the functions suggested by the Woodson
Court, and the amplification of the underlying concerns developed in Bauxites and Burger King, it is clear that a fairness component is an integral part of a due process analysis, which must be
satisfied even in the absence of any concern over sovereign
power. Granting that Congress is empowered to authorize nationwide service of process, the case by case implementation of
that authority should still be limited by a due process requirement
of fairness to the defendant in the choice of the particular
forum.'

58

There are a number of arguments that may be made in oppo157. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10.
158. This application of a fairness standard based on the Bauxites analysis
was rejected by the district court in First Federal Savings & Loan v. Oppenheim,
Appel, Dixon & Co., 634 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The court pointed out
that the author of Bauxites, Justice White, gave no indication of changing the
"legal landscape" in the area, and had indicated that there were no constitutional restrictions on nationwide service in an earlier dissent. Id. at 1347. See
supra note 60. Moreover, the court relied heavily on Mariash and Fitzsimmons for
its view that a fairness analysis was inappropriate. 634 F. Supp. at 1347-48. Finally, the court felt that to adopt such a standard would make decisions difficult
because courts would be required to make a highly factbound analysis. Id. at
1348. As to whether the "legal landscape" has been changed, a full review of
the jurisdictional cases suggests this is a logical progression for the Court. See
supra text accompanying notes 110-50. This analysis also suggests the weaknesses of Mariash and Fitzsimmons. In response to the argument that such a
factbound analysis will create problems, it should be noted that the Supreme
Court has clearly rejected this argument in jurisdictional cases. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977) (stating in response to argument that in renjurisdiction should not be subjected to inherently uncertain test of InternationalShoe
that fairness standard could be easily applied in most cases and in those cases
which were difficult Court was not prepared to sacrifice fairness for simplicity).
It is interesting to note that the Oppenheim court had no difficulty doing a fairness
analysis in a footnote. 634 F. Supp. at 1348 n.9.
It has been argued that a constitutional limitation on Congress' power to
authorize nationwide service of process is necessary because safeguards of a
nonconstitutional nature, such as venue provisions, could be eliminated by Congress, and even if those provisions were not eliminated, defendants would be
disadvantaged because of the absence of the right of collateral attack, and the
difficulty of obtaining review and reversal of what are perceived as primarily discretionary trial court decisions. Fullerton, ConstitutionalLimits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdictionin the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1984). It should
be noted, however, that even in the absence of venue provisions, courts could
provide some protection for defendants under principles of transfer and forum
non conveniens. See infra text accompanying notes 169-78. It has been suggested
that in the context of an overall scheme to modernize venue and service of process in federal court, it would be appropriate to have a general provision for
nationwide service of process with venue provisions used to ensure a convenient
forum. Barett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestionsfor Re-
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sition to this view. As the courts suggested in Briggs and Driver, it
might be argued that a fairness-due process analysis is relevant
only where the sovereign is attempting to assert power beyond its
borders. 159 But, as argued above, this approach is logically inconsistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in the analogous area of
state court jurisdiction. 6 0
A second argument was suggested by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Fitzsimmons.1t 6 ' The
court rejected the consideration of fairness as a constitutional restriction because it had always been "applied under the rubric of
forum non conveniens."' 16 2 In so stating, the court left open the
question whether the fairness factor had "constitutional significance." 163 In using the term 'forum non conveniens" the court presumably intended to encompass all the aspects of venue which
seek to limit the choice of forum within the judicial system that
has adjudicatory power over the defendant.
This concept of federal venue as a means of allocating cases
operates in two ways: first, by statutes which arbitrarily denote a
number of locations in which a case may be heard. 1 64 Such provisions are structured to allow for suit in certain arbitrarily defined
form, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608, 629 (1954); ALI STUDY, supra note 26, §§ 1314 (Federal Question Jurisdiction), 217 (multi-party, multi-state diversity).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 47-55.
160. Clermont, supra note 111, at 439 n. 132 ("T]he tendency to ignore the
separate concept of forum-reasonableness explains the misleading statements
[that power is all that is relevant in this analysis] in the Stafford-type authorities
S.. and the Driver-type cases .... ") (citations omitted).
161. 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
162. Id. at 334 n.5; accord FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 255-58
(5th Cir. 1981). For a further discussion, see supra note 100. Decisions such as
these should be seriously questioned in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in Bauxites. Thus, in Burstein v. State Bar of California, the court questioned, without deciding, the continued vitality ofJim Walter when it stated that
"this court in Jim Walter Corp. suggested that the conceptual requirements of
both [fifth and fourteenth amendment] due process clauses were the same, albeit
relating to different sovereigns. If this is true, then the rationale of Jim Ifalter
Corp. may have been undermined by Insurance Corp. of Ireland." 693 F.2d 511,
516 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982); Bamford v. Hobbs, 569 F. Supp. 160, 165 (S.D. Tex.
1983) (suggesting thatJim Walter was "seriously undermine[d]" by the Bauxites
decision); accord GRM v. Equine Inv. & Management Group, 596 F. Supp. 307,
312-15 (S.D. Tex. 1984). In GRM, the court, however, cited some district court
opinions which have continued to apply a "national-contacts" test. 596 F. Supp.
at 314 n.9.
163. 589 F.2d at 334 n.5.
164. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1982) (permits diversity action to be
brought in district where all plaintiffs reside, defendants reside, or claim arose).
Since such provisions are arbitrary they may allow for suit in a highly inconvenient place while not allowing it in a convenient one. Also the venue provisions
adopted in relation to nationwide service provisions are invariably drafted

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988

35

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33: p. I

fora without regard to the convenience or fairness of those
choices in particular cases. Whether such a provision will be
helpful in avoiding an unfair choice of forum depends exclusively
on whether the particular statute is more or less restrictive in the
choices it permits. 6 5 For example, in cases under section
1391(e) the provision will do little to limit the plaintiff's choice
since she may always sue in the judicial district where she resides. 16 6 Even in cases where plaintiff's residence is not an acceptable forum, the statutory choices may be broadened by
language such as that in the venue provision used in Mariash and
Fitzsimmons. Such provisions permit venue in any district where
"any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred"-a
provision which has been read broadly by the courts. 1 67 On the
other hand, if a venue statute contains neither of these provisions,
but only permits suit where the defendant is an inhabitant, is
found or transacts business, it is more likely to ensure a fair and
convenient forum. 16 8 This is only to suggest that Congress may
avoid due process problems by carefully limiting venue in nationwide service cases. It does not address the question whether due
process operates to set parameters for congressional action which
would become relevant when the plaintiff's forum of choice was
unreasonable in a particular case.
The second method of allocation operates by transfer provisions which allow courts to move a suit from one district to another for the convenience of the parties and in the interests of
justice. 69 As such, these provisions operate in a fashion analogous to the common law concept offorum non conveniens.170 If the
broadly to favor the plaintiff consistent with the purpose of the service provision. E.g., id. § 1391(d).
165. Fullerton, supra note 158, at 71-76.
166. That provision was the basis for venue in Driver, 74 F.R.D. at 400,
while venue in Bniggs was based on another provision in 1391(e) which authorized venue where any defendant had an official residence. 569 F.2d at 4-6.
167. For example, the Mariash court concluded that this provision was met
since the transfer agent had to be contacted in New York to remove the restrictive legend on the stock in order to complete the transaction which had nothing
to do with the reasonableness of the forum. 496 F.2d at 1143-45. Also a
number of courts have adopted a co-conspirator venue theory which grants
venue as to all defendants sued in a case involving a common scheme if any one
defendant has acted within the forum district. E.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1985).
168. See Fullerton, supra note 158, at 74-76.
169. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1982).
170. The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens in the federal court
system is only utilized in those rare cases where the more convenient forum is a
state court, or a court in a foreign country. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
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concept of a constitutional basis for a fairness analysis is accepted,
it may be less important whether such analysis is denominated
under a "rubric" of jurisdiction or forum non conveniens,'71 since
the resulting analysis should be the same. As a matter of structure, however, the maintenance of this standard under a jurisdictional title would be superior. This is so because the
development of concepts such as forum non conveniens and transfer
were intended to limit a jurisdictional system which focused on
physical power over the defendant, rather than intended as methods of finding a fair forum for the litigation. 17 2 It would be more
appropriate to structure a jurisdictional analysis to deal with the
affirmative responsibility to provide a constitutionally fair forum;
and as a consequence to de-emphasize these other analyses which
historically have not had a constitutional basis, leaving wide dis173
cretion in the trial court.
Those who support the predominance of the concept of
transfer in this area have further argued that, while a constitutional fairness doctrine does exist, it is unnecessary to consider
because all the problems it would address are handled by subconstitutional concepts such as transfer. As one court has stated:
Some commentators have suggested that the due process clause of the fifth amendment imposes upon the
personal jurisdiction of the federal courts restrictions
similar to those imposed on state courts under the fourteenth amendment. . . . As this court has observed,
"[a]lthough the propriety of service issuing from a federal court need not necessarily be tested by the same
yardstick as is the constitutional limitation upon service
of process from a state court, the latter standard provides a helpful and often used guideline." . . . Strict federal venue requirements, however, have made it
§ 3828 (1976). An example of this
limited use offorum non conveniens in federal court is Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235 (1981). In Reyno the Supreme Court pointed out that transfer is
more than a mere codification of forum non conveniens, but is instead a revision
which gives greater discretion to the court to transfer since it would not involve
a dismissal. Id. at 253.
171. One problem raised by the choice of title is that historically defendants have had greater freedom to collaterally attack a default judgment for lack
of personal jurisdiction, but not for lack of venue. Currie, The Federal Courts and
the American Law Institute, Part H, 36 U. CI. L. REV. 268, 303-04 & n.430 (1969);
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Fullerton, supra note 158, at 36-37.

172. Ehrenzweig, supra note 154, at 305-09.
173. See id. at 312.
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unnecessary to develop ajudicial doctrine of the limits of
personal jurisdiction in federal cases. Thus, as a practical matter, the most significant restraint on the personal
jurisdiction of federal courts in federal cases is service of
process . ... 174
There are several reasons why it would be unwise to follow
this approach. The purpose of a constitutional limitation on jurisdiction is to serve as a floor which limits Congress' legislative
use of venue and the discretionary right of courts to change
venue. 175 In the same way that fairness serves as a constitutional
limit on assertions of jurisdiction by state courts, it should serve
as a limit on the federal system's use of process and venue. In
addition, by only addressing the subconstitutional issue of venue,
such an analysis encourages arbitrary line drawing between jurisdiction and venue. These arbitrary distinctions, in turn, lead
courts to erroneously view jurisdiction as exclusively a question of
"power" and venue as the sole basis behind considerations of
fairness. 17 6 The development of a due process analysis in the
state-court jurisdiction cases has shown the increasing interdependency of power and fairness as analytic tools. 1 77 This should
be encouraged by a more unified jurisdictional approach which
recognizes this interdependency. Finally, to focus on the "fairness" as the domain of a subconstitutional venue analysis is to deemphasize an issue of central significance which would be best
174. Terry v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 658 F.2d 398, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1981)
(citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit subsequently overruled Ten-' on other
grounds. Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 427 (5th
Cir. 1986) (overruled only to extent that it held no specific congressional authorization was necessary to assert jurisdiction).
175. See Clermont, supra note 111, at 437-41. Professor Clermont has sug'gested a "reformulation" of jurisdictional analysis which recognizes the constitutional concept of fairness under the title of "forum-reasonableness."
176. A better way of distinguishing jurisdiction and venue is based on the
view that
jurisdiction is relatively more concerned with fairness and venue more
with inconvenience. If the two concepts should be described as applying along a continuum, one extreme might be demonstrated by the case
in which the corporate defendant's contacts with the forum were so
minimal that it would be patently unfair, let alone inconvenient, to require him to defend an action there. Due Process would say that the
forum lacked jurisdiction

....

At the other extreme would be the case

in which not only were jurisdiction and venue proper, but the inconvenience caused the corporation by requiring it to defend the suit where
brought would be so slight that a motion for discretionary transfer ...
would be denied.
Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 1966) (citations omitted).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 110-50.
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confronted head-on by courts.178
In addressing these arguments it is important to recall that
there may be situations in which problems of convenience and
fairness can be solved by venue provisions, but because such tools
are available does not mean that a constitutional due process
standard cannot continue to operate as a limiting standard of judicial control. To conclude otherwise would be illogical in light
of the Supreme Court's efforts to clarify the underlying concerns
of due process in the state court area. This point was made clear
by Justice Brennan in Burger King, where he emphasized that even
if a defendant had sufficient forum activities to warrant an assertion of jurisdiction, other fairness factors might warrant a denial
ofjurisdiction. Justice Brennan went on to point out that many of
those considerations could be dealt with "through means short of
finding jurisdiction unconstitutional."' 179 This did not lead to the
conclusion that a constitutional standard was unnecessary, but
rather, that "[m]inimum requirements inherent in the concept of
'fair play and substantial justice' may defeat the reasonableness of
jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities."'' 8 0 The clear import of the Court's reasoning is
that while venue and transfer provisions may avoid many
problems before they reach constitutional proportions, the due
process clause continues to be present and to operate as a minimum standard of fairness to protect defendants from being unfairly treated.
178. See sulpra notes 158 and 171. Thus in a case such as Briggs it is possible
that the trial court would quickly dispose of the transfer question because it felt
that if it had jurisdiction because it had "power," it need not be concerned with
the exercise of discretionary power based on convenience. See supra note 44.
The Court of Appeals in Driver did raise the possibility of transfer, which was not
mentioned in the district court's opinion. The Court of Appeals stated that it
would expect courts to be sympathetic to motions for change of venue
when defendants would otherwise be substantially prejudiced and when
there is an alternative venue that would protect parties' rights. Furthermore, we note that officers of the federal government are different from
private defendants because they can anticipate that their official acts
may affect people in every part of the United States.
577 F.2d at 157. While the court's suggestion that change of venue be given
serious consideration is important, the fact that it was little considered in Driver
and Briggs gives support to the view that the discretionary nature and history of
transfer leave substantial risks for defendants which can only be protected with a
constitutional due process minimum requirement. Courts are simply too willing
to exercise their discretion to allow the plaintiff's choice without careful analysis.
See Fitzsiminons, 589 F.2d at 334 n.6.
179. 471 U.S. at 477.
180. Id.; Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1033-35
(1987).
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Fair Forum Standard

If such an approach is correct, then it is clear that due process does require a fair forum for the defendant. The question
remains, however, what standards are relevant to this determination of fairness. It is not possible to simply use the tests which the
Supreme Court has developed in the state jurisdictional cases. In
setting up that -flexible concept,' 8 1 the Court was concerned
about the question of a fair forum and the sovereign power of the
state.' 82 Therefore it focused on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation" in determining the appropriateness of an assertion of jurisdiction. 83 However, federal
courts would only be concerned with the fair forum function in
establishing standards in nationwide service of process cases. In
light of this and the congressional purpose of providing a convenient forum for the plaintiff in these cases, less emphasis need be
placed on the defendant, since there is no justification for favoring one party over the other. 8 4 Rather, it would be appropriate
for a court to make its determination by looking more broadly at
both parties, the transaction which underlies the lawsuit, the nature of the litigation and the relationship of these factors to the
chosen forum.' 8 5 This analysis is appropriate in the context of
situations where the fair allocation of cases within the federal
court system is of concern, rather than the power to require the
defendant to appear.186
181. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
182. See, e.g., Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292-94.
183. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204.
184. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 154, at 1127-28.
185. This approach led Justice Black to dissent in Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958), and state his view of what was relevant to deciding whether a
defendant could be required to appear in a particular state's forum.
It seems to me that where a transaction has as much relationship to a
State as Mrs. Donner's appointment had to Florida its courts ought to
have power to adjudicate controversies arising out of that transaction,
unless litigation there would impose such a heavy and disproportionate
burden on a nonresident that it would offend what this Court has referred to as "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 258-59 (Black, J., dissenting). Fullerton has suggested a more defendantfocused approach, which would analyze the inconvenience to the defendant and
whether the defendant should have reasonably anticipated litigation in the forum, along with government interests in litigating in a particular place in deciding whether the assertion ofjurisdiction is proper. Fullerton, supra note 158, at
38-60.
186. It has been suggested that this analysis is appropriate even when the
case involves state court jurisdiction. E.g., Hazard, supra note 110, at 281; Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REx'. 33, 79-90
(1978). But see Louis, supra note 139, at 408-09, 423-25.
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This approach was suggested and embellished upon by Justice Brennan in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Shaffer v.
Heitner.18 7 In Shaffer (a state court jurisdiction case) he argued
that the due process analysis was "closely related" to the analysis
of choice of laws because
[i]n either case an important linchpin is the extent of
contacts between the controversy, the parties, and the
[I]mportant considerations certainly inforum State ....
clude the expectancies of the parties and the fairness of
governing the defendants' acts and behavior by rules of
[T]he deciconduct created by a given jurisdiction ....
sion that it is fair to bind a defendant by a State's laws
and rules should prove to be highly relevant to the fairness of permitting that same State to accept jurisdiction
1 88
for adjudicating the controversy.
While we are not concerned with choice of law here, those same
basic factors seem most relevant to any fairness analysis.
A similar note was sounded in Woodson, where the Court set
forth elements, in addition to the burden on the defendant, which
it thought were relevant to the fairness question. These factors
included:
the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, ...
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief ... at least when that interest is not adequately
protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum,
...the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies .... 189
Putting aside any particular state's interest, and substituting for it
the interest of the federal government, these opinions support an
analysis which focuses on the plaintiff's and defendant's desire to
litigate in a particular forum and the government's concern that
special protection be given to certain classes of plaintiffs, but
which at the same time allows for an economical resolution of dis187. 433 U.S. at 219 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
188. Id. at 225; see also Woodson, 444 U.S. at 299-301 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
189. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292 (citations omitted).
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putes. Weighing these elements, a court would decide whether it
was warranted in requiring a defendant to appear.
A comparable formula was suggested in Oxford First Corp. v.
PNC Liquidating Corp.,190 in which the district court attempted to
place some fifth amendment fairness limits on nationwide service
of process in a suit under the Securities Exchange Act. The factors which the Oxford court considered relevant to its decision
were (1) the extent of the defendant's contacts with the district in
which the action was brought; (2) the inconvenience to the defendant of having to defend in a jurisdiction other than the place
of his residence; (3) judicial economy; (4) the probable situs of
discovery; and (5) the nature of the regulated activity and its impact outside defendant's state of residence or business.' 9' These
factors are certainly helpful. However, as has already been noted,
once fairness to litigate in a particular place is accepted as the
basis of this analysis, rather than the power to require the defendant to appear, it would be proper to eliminate those factors which
focus exclusively on the needs and burdens placed on the defendant, and substitute a balancing of the interests of both parties and
the sovereign in efficiently disposing of the case.' 92 Once this is
done it would be possible to focus on the underlying transaction,
the litigation and the interests of all those involved in determining whether the litigation is in a constitutionally adequate forum
for due process purposes.
Thus, a court should consider a variety of factors in determining whether an assertion of jurisdiction under a nationwide
service of process provision should require a person to defend in
190. 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974). As indicated earlier, this opinion
was criticized in Fitzsimmons on the view that a fairness test was not appropriate
in these circumstances. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100. Contra Smith
v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 674 F. Supp. 542, 544 (W.D. W. Va. 1987) (following
Oxford First because it "recognizes the underlying rationale of fundamental fairness to restrictions on jurisdiction").
191. 372 F. Supp. at 203-04.
192. Thus, in GRA v. Equine Investment & Management Group, the district
court cited Oxford First with approval, but in setting forth its fairness test the
court made a subtle shift towards a more balanced consideration of fairness.
596 F. Supp. 307, 314 (S.D. Tex. 1984). Its factors were:
(1) the burden imposed upon the defendants by Texas litigation,
(2) defendants' reasonable expectations and the foreseeability of Texas
litigation, (3) plaintiffs' interest in convenient and effective relief,
(4) the federal judicial system's interest in efficiently resolving controversies, and (5) Texas's interest in having a court in Texas adjudicate
this dispute.
Id. at 315, In a footnote the court suggested that the five factors could be summarized as weighing "the relative equities and convenience between parties."
Id. at 315 n.12.
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a particular district court. One such factor would be where the
events took place and whether the witnesses and various types of
evidence would be available in the chosen forum. On a practical
level it would be highly inefficient to allow a case to be conducted
19
in a court which cannot conveniently hear it.
A second factor is the relative convenience of the plaintiff
and the defendant, and their reasonable expectations in litigating
in the chosen forum. Of particular significance is whether either
party's activities are so localized, or conversely, so pervasively
multistate, as to warrant allowing the case to be heard in the chosen forum. 9 4 Given the nature of the parties and the location of
the forum where the plaintiff instituted suit, it may be the case
that litigating in the chosen forum would not be unreasonable for
the defendant, whereas requiring the plaintiff to travel to the defendant's residence might be. For example, if the plaintiff was an
individual residing in the forum, and the defendant was a corporation whose business reasonably lead it to expect suits in other
districts, the court would be acting properly in giving substantial
weight to the plaintiff's choice. This would be particularly true if
the defendant's -multistate activities aggressively impinged on a
plaintiff whose activities were local to the chosen forum. 95 Even
though the defendant's aggressiveness was not sufficient to satisfy
a state court minimum contacts test, it might be sufficient under a
more flexible analysis that was concerned only with the fairness of
the forum and not with the sovereign power of the court involved.
Finally, it would be important for the court to weigh its own
interest, and that of the parties, in resolving the case in one proceeding. This would be particularly important in cases where the
other fairness factors were not dispositive. For example, in a case
involving multiple districts and multiple plaintiffs or defendants,
various interests could lead to a situation where different fora
would be fairest depending on the point of view considered. At
this juncture the court should have some flexibility to decide
whether the plaintiff's choice was reasonable, and if so, whether
to hear the entire case in that one location.' 96
193. See Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal.3d 143, 150-51, 545 P.2d 264, 26869, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356-57 (1976).
194. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 154, at 1168.
195. See Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction .lfter Shaffer and
Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 861, 891-92 (1978).
196. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.2d 893, 458
P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969). This legitimate policy concern is also the
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If the interests of the parties were in equipoise, then the
court should resolve the dispute in favor of the plaintiff's choice,
since there would be an absence of unjustified unfairness to the
defendant. Given the absence, the congressional purpose evidenced in the particular statute of favoring the plaintiff's choice
of forum, should be upheld.
The factors suggested here are not intended as an exclusive
list but rather as an open ended series of suggestions informing
the type of factual questions necessary to consider in determining
the fairness under the due process clause of requiring litigation to
be conducted in a particular court. Even if these standards are
used by the courts, it does not necessarily mean that the result in
any particular case will be different than it has been in the past.
But in making its decision, a court will be applying an appropriate
standard to determine the parties' rights.
Particularly in some areas, such as cases under the Inter97
pleader Act, it has already been suggested earlier in this article
that courts should weigh heavily the plaintiff's need for a single
forum for resolution of the dispute. It would be unfair to the
plaintiff in those circumstances to decline jurisdiction over all of
the defendants in any reasonably chosen forum. Thus the interests of the plaintiff and the judicial system in a single adjudication
would outweigh the interests of any particular defendant. 9 8
In other areas, however, more emphasis may be placed on
some of the other factors mentioned. Of special importance may
be the relative convenience of obtaining discovery and evidence,
as well as the district court's familiarity with the locale in which
the transaction took place. Also the relative interests of the plaintiff and defendant in having a convenient forum may be important, especially as this relates to those who have aggressively
pursued or imposed themselves on others. Thus, in a case such
as Mariash 199 the facts indicated that the plaintiff was contacted in
New York and the various opinion letters were sent to New York
even though the corporation whose stock was involved was incorporated in Massachusetts and the defendant-attorneys resided in
basis for the broad application of venue provisions which courts have used
under a co-conspirator venue theory. See supra note 167.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
198. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315
(1950); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 346-48, 316 P.2d 960, 96566 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
199. 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974). For a further discussion see snpra text
accompanying notes 77-89.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss1/1

44

Lusardi: Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the Pow

1988]

NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS

45

Massachusetts. 20 0 Also many of the nonparty witnesses were in
New York. 20 Given the multistate nature of the defendants' activities and the fact that so much of the underlying transaction
occurred in New York, it would be reasonable to require the attorney-defendants to appear there, even if they did not have the
requisite contacts to satisfy a state jurisdiction minimum contacts
test.

20 2

In Fitzsimmons,20 3 the defendant, Barton, who challenged jurisdiction, had made several trips to the chosen forum. These
trips were apparently not so directly related to the fraudulent activity as to satisfy the Illinois long-arm statute, which the district
court had erroneously assumed applied. 20 4 Since the court of appeals concluded that the assertion ofjurisdiction did not require a
fairness analysis, it chose not to develop the facts necessary to
make a firm analysis in this case. However, the opinion suggests
that the other defendants in the lawsuit were subject to jurisdiction in the forum since they chose not to challenge on personal
jurisdiction grounds. 20 5 Beyond this, the nature of Barton's trips
indicate multistate activities 20 6 which should have reasonably led
200. 496 F.2d at 1140-41.
201. Id. This would include the plaintiff's broker, independent legal counsel hired to give an opinion letter and the corporation's transfer agent. Id. at
1141. Also the other defendants presumably had substantial relations with New
York since they chose not to challenge the assertion ofjurisdiction, although this
is never specifically discussed in the opinion. If the court had required the analysis which is suggested in this article, it presumably would have required more
discovery, instead of relying on the "barest skeleton of a record" as it did here.
Id. at 1140.
202. The district court had in fact dismissed the defendant-attorneys on the
erroneous assumption that the New York long-arm statute applied and that
these defendants were not subject to jurisdiction under it. Id. at 1142.
203. 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979). For a further discusision, see supra text
accompanying notes 90-100.
204. 589 F.2d at 331-32. Defendant Barton was president and chief executive officer of United Founders Life Insurance Company whose business was primarily generated by the Teamsters' Pension Fund, whose Trustees were the
plaintiffs in this action. He was also a director and officer of Reis Corporation
which was a creditor of United Founders. In turn Reis was indebted to the Pension Fund. The Pension Fund considered the possibility of self-insuring, and
this created the possibility that United Founders would not be able to pay Reis,
and Reis would then be unable to pay the Pension Fund. Ultimately the Pension
Fund did not self-insure, but it did alter the terms of its insurance. This led to a
need to restructure the Reis indebtedness to the Pension Fund. It was during
this restructuring that the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations took place.
The district court felt that Barton's trips to Illinois did not constitute sufficient
contacts with Illinois because it was satisfied that those trips related to self-insurance plans and not to the debt restructuring. Id.
205. See id. at 331.
206. Id. at 334 n.6.
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him to expect to be subject to suit in a forum such as that chosen
by the plaintiffs. If, in addition, a sufficient portion of the transaction underlying the lawsuit occurred in the forum,2 0 7 then it
would clearly be reasonable to require the defendant to appear
there.
Cases such as Briggs20 8 and Driver 20 9 may require a somewhat
different conclusion. In Briggs all of the events relating to the
grand jury proceeding took place in Florida and three of the four
defendants apparently resided there. 210 The plaintiffs were called
to testify in Florida and resided in a number of different states,
but none resided in the District of Columbia where the suit was
brought. 2 11 The only connection the case had with the District of
Columbia was that the fourth defendant had his official residence
there. 2 12 In these circumstances it would be inconsistent with due
process to require the Florida defendants to appear in the District
of Columbia. The events took place in Florida, three of the defendants resided there and the alleged improper activity of all the
defendants occurred there. In addition, the plaintiffs' residences
would not indicate any compelling reason for litigating in the District of Columbia. Under these circumstances due process should
require that the suit be brought in Florida with the nationwide
207. The court specifically left open whether any of the defendant's arguments might be relevant to the question of proper venue in the district since
section 27 requires an act or transaction constituting the violation to have occurred in the district. Id. at 334-35 & n.7.
208. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980). See supra text accompanying
notes 42-48. One aspect of suits under the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962
may place cases such as Briggs and Driver in a special category. Since the
Supreme Court ruled that defendants were not subject to damages under the
Act, the result is that in most cases officers will only be sued for mandamus while
they are in office. See 444 U.S. at 543-44. As such the local United States Attorney's Office and the Justice Department will bear most of the burdens of litigation, and the officer will only rarely have to appear and, then, at government
expense. Id. The realities of this type of case will presumably tip the balance in
plaintiff's favor in most instances, while not changing the fact that the balancing
must be done.
209. Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 147 (1st
Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds sub nom., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
For a further discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 49-58. For a special
caveat in this type of case, see supra note 208.
210. Brief for the Petitioners at 3, Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980)
(No. 77-1546).
211. Six of the plaintiffs resided in Florida, two in Texas, one in Delaware
and one in New York. Id. at 4.
212. 444 U.S. at 532. This defendant joined the other defendants in requesting the case be transferred to the Northern District of Florida. Id. at 531
n.2.
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service provision being used to require the District of Columbia
defendant to appear in the appropriate federal court located in
that state.
In Driver the basis for bringing the class action in Rhode Island Federal District Court was that it was the residence of one of
the representative plaintiffs. 2 13 All of the alleged improper inter2 14
ference with the plaintiffs' mail occurred in New York City.
Consequently, the defendants could argue that there was no reasonable basis for this case to be heard in Rhode Island. However,
the plaintiffs might respond that the defendants' interference with
their mail constituted multistate activity which had an impact in
the locale where the letters were mailed. As a result, the defendants should reasonably expect to litigate these questions where
their actions had an impact. Since Rhode Island was apparently
such a place, 2 15 great weight should be given to the plaintiffs'
choice of forum. This should be especially so, if the defendants
failed to show any particular burdens on them. Relevant to this
latter question would be whether there would be any discovery or
trial problems raised by a Rhode Island forum. This would appear to be the most difficult case of the group for the court to
make a determination. However, in light of the congressional
presumption in favor of plaintiffs' choice of forum, it would seem
that a strong argument could be made for allowing the case to
continue in Rhode Island.
In all of these cases, it might be necessary for the court to
allow the parties preliminary discovery to ascertain additional
facts. This was apparently not done in these cases because of the
limited standards of fifth amendment due process which the
courts felt obliged to use. Once the appropriate information is
before the court it could make a careful review of all the factual
permutations in the particular situation in deciding whether to
dismiss or transfer the action. 2 16 Such a determination would not
be made based upon a wooden analysis of whether there was ade213. The other plaintiffs who represented the class were residents of New
York, Minnesota, Connecticut and California. 577 F.2d at 149 n.2.
214. Id. at 149 n.3.
215. Driver, 74 F.R.D. at 400 n.23.
216. It is clear that in the absence of personal jurisdiction, a federal court
has the option to transfer the case in the interests ofjustice to a district that can
properly assert jurisdiction. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466-67
(1962); 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3827, at 171 (1976); Comment, Change of Venue in Absence of PersonalJurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) and 1406(a), 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 735 (1963).
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quate notice, but rather on a more supple consideration of all the
components relevant to due process.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, Congress has the power to authorize nationwide service of process, but that power should be limited by
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In establishing
the restrictions on this congressional power, the courts have
failed to establish meaningful due process requirements. Consistent with what the Supreme Court has established as the functions
of a due process analysis in state-court jurisdiction cases, it is
clear that this congressional power should be limited by a case by
case analysis of the fairness of a forum to hear a particular matter.
Such an analysis will require a careful review of the relations of
the plaintiff, defendant and the transaction involved in the litigation in order to ensure that the defendant receives the protection
to which he is entitled under the Constitution.
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